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Land, ‘Development’ and ‘Security’
in Bangladesh and India: An
Introduction
Katy Gardner and Eva Gerharz
1 Writing of  the often violent  processes  of  land expropriation in Bangladesh in which
arable land has been reduced from 9 million hectares in the 1990s to around 8 million in
the  mid-2000s,  Feldman  and  Geisler  declare that  the  country  is  ‘an  epicentre  of
displacement’  (2012:  973).  In  India,  scholars  have  described  similar  processes,  many
focussing upon how state sponsored property speculation and business interests lead to
the ongoing dispossession of farmers, whether in the form of Special Economic Zones
(Levien 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2013, Cross 2014), large scale mining projects (Padel & Das
2010), conservation (Münster & Münster 2012), agribusiness and aquaculture,1 housing or
industrialisation (Adduci 2009, Le Mons Walker 2008, Mishra 2011, Akram-Lodhi 2009,
Münster  & Strümpell  2014,  Adnan 2013).  Kathy le  Mons Walker  estimates  that  since
Independence in India,  over 30 million people have been displaced by ‘development’
(2008: 580), arguing that land is the biggest site of struggle in the subcontinent (Le Mons
Walker 2008: 589). As land changes hands and usage, the implications for rural economies
that  were once based on agriculture are  enormous.  In  most  instances  there  are  few
economic opportunities for newly landless people, for even if the land has been cleared
for Special  Economic Zones or extractive industries,  these rarely employ local people
(Makki & Geisler 2011: 4, Levien 2011a, 2011b, Gardner et al. 2012). Rather, what awaits are
increasing immiseration for those with the least social capital and opportunities for vast
profits for those with the most, almost always resulting in a heightening of social and
economic inequality (cf. Corbridge and Shah, 2013).
2 What sense are we to make of these processes? Whilst displacement and dispossession are
hardly new to South Asia—the colonial period was characterised by the encroachment of
land and forest by the Raj for railways, mines and plantations and Nehru’s India by large
scale infra structure, mining and industrial projects—the pace and scale of dispossession,
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and the shift  in the value of  land from its  productive use to its  commodification,  is
notable in this, the neoliberal era of enclosure (Akram-Lodhi 2007). Crucially, in India the
state has shifted from being the owner of industry in the post-Independence era to being
a land-broker for private multinational and national corporations in the 2000s (Levien
2013), a period marked both by rapid economic growth and the persistence of poverty
(Drèze & Sen 2013). This new space for officials and bureaucrats to broker land deals has
transformed existing modes of governance with far-reaching consequences at all levels
(Goldman 2011). Close relationships between business people and government officials,
which have been described as ‘crony capitalism’, have not only shaped what has been
commonly  referred  to  as  ‘neoliberal  India’  (Münster  &  Strümpell  2014)  but  also
contemporary Bangladesh, where hyper development is enabled by the state’s neoliberal
‘open door’  policies.  An emerging literature from India charts these transformations,
focussing largely upon increasing inequality and impoverishment (cf. Corbridge & Shah
2013, Münster & Strümpell 2014) as well as the crisis of agriculture, impoverishment of
farmers and exploitation of labour in the informal sector (cf. Harriss-White 2005, Harriss-
White et al. 2009, Reddy & Mishra 2009, Mohanty 2005, Breman 1993, 2007, 2010, Lerche
2011, Siddiqui 2015).
3 Whilst  much  of  this  work  rightly  stresses  the  effects of  neoliberalism,  other  work
addresses  the process  of  dispossession:  the  means  by which changes  of  land use  and
differential access take place2 and, indeed, the varying forms of resistance or compliance
by different  groups  and individuals  over  time (see,  for  example,  Levien 2011a, 2013,
Feldman & Geisler 2012,  Cross 2014).  It  is to the latter questions of process that this
volume contributes. In particular we aim to flesh out issues raised by David Harvey’s
widely discussed concept of ‘Accumulation by Dispossession’ (Harvey 2003). Whilst this
has been used by scholars to analyse processes of land loss (see, in particular, Gardner
2012, Levien 2011a, 2012, 2013, Münster & Strümpell 2014), the concept is frustratingly
vague as to the actual techniques involved. For example, Harvey points to the collusion
between states and corporations,  but gives little detail  of  what this involves and has
nothing to say on the role of local elites or the ideological justifications involved. As
others have argued, the commodification of land is not always met with resistance by
farmers; industrialisation may evoke aspirations and hope as much as fear and resistance
(Cross 2014, Vijayabaskar 2010). Combined with this, the appropriation of agricultural
land, commons and forestry for industrial use or infrastructure has long been justified by
national or local plans of ‘development’ or ‘security’. Only a few years ago concepts like
‘environmental  justice’  highlighted  that  these  development  projects  may  have  far-
reaching ecological consequences which need to be analysed in relation to their socio-
economic  implications.  Moreover,  the  very  notion  of  ‘dispossession’  implies  a
straightforward transfer of rights in which those that once possessed are dispossessed.
Yet as we shall see in the papers that follow, the local realities of land use, differential
forms of  access  and property  rights  are  often far  more  nuanced,  involving  complex
interrelationships between groups of users, legality, the state, and customary forms of
access,  not to say cross cutting discourses of development,  modernity,  belonging and
rights.
4 In order to interrogate these issues further, this volume brings together work from India
and Bangladesh which explores three interlinked questions: (1) how different groups gain
access to land, either via legislation, (re)negotiated customary rights, or material use (2)
how rights and access are lost and restricted via collusions between states, the military
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and private interests and the techniques of disappropriation and discursive formations
used and (3) the responses to this, which indicate that simply framing the contestations
and negotiations involved in terms of local farmers’ resistance to corporations or states is
too simplistic.
5 In this introduction we provide an initial framework for these questions. After exploring
recent theoretical approaches to dispossession and land loss, an endeavor which is taken
up  in  more  detail  in  the  subsequent  paper  by  Adnan,  we  scope  out  the  ideological
apparatus of contemporary dispossessions—the discursive formations of ‘development’
and ‘security’.  After  this  we  explore  coalitions  between states,  corporations  and the
military. Finally, we turn to questions of violence, security and resistance. The volume is
based on a panel on land dispossession, development and security held at the EASAS
conference in July 2014. Originally our intention was to draw upon work from the entire
South Asian region; our call for papers was however met only by researchers working in
Bangladesh and India. The comparison between these two countries is instructive.
Whereas we can witness rapid rates of  land dispossession and corporatisation taking
place all over South Asia, Bangladesh and India (particularly West Bengal) share similar
historical  processes.  During colonialism,  agricultural  production in the Bengal  region
faced substantial transformations when the Zamindari system was reformed in the late 18
th  century.  Zamindars  now  had  control  over  the  estate  and  the  cultivators  were
transformed into peasants  without  rights  (Lewis  2011:  50).  Many of  the estates  were
owned by high-caste Hindus during colonialism, who left East Bengal after 1947 and were
replaced  by  wealthy  Muslims.  Lewis  (2011:  57)  shows  that  this  produced  vertical
patronage and factional ties and prevented the emergence of peasant movements based
on horizontal  solidarity.  In post-colonial  West  Bengal,  however,  such movements are
firmly established—a contrast which is also reflected in the papers in this volume. India
and Bangladesh also share a post-colonial emphasis on food security, which partly stems
from the devastating consequences of colonial mismanagement of food stock during the
1940s.  Meanwhile,  India  and  Bangladesh  have  followed  quite  different  paths  in  the
institutionalisation of democratic rule. In contrast to India where democracy has been,
despite some well-known deficiencies, firmly established, Bangladesh has struggled with
authoritarianism  since  the  subcontinent’s  partition.  Thanks  to  communalism  and
subsequent nationalist ideals, ethnic divides have been high on the agenda when it comes
to  the  distribution  of  land  rights  (see  Feldman’s  paper).  The  historical  and  political
contexts of Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan are, no doubt, leading to different processes. Sri
Lanka and Nepal have been dealing with land distribution quite differently from India
and Bangladesh and in Sri Lanka at least, leftist governments pursued land reforms which
transferred previously rivately owned land under state control. All three countries have
also  been  struggling  with  different  problems  which  postponed  far-reaching  reforms
towards a neoliberal agenda. With our initial focus on India and Bangladesh, we hope that
the papers  offered  here  can  both  stimulate  further  research  and  be  used  to  make
comparisons with other countries within the wider region of South Asia.
 
Conceptualising land loss and displacement in India
and Bangladesh
6 Land loss,  enclosures and dispossession have long been features of  life in South Asia
(Adnan 2013, Le Mons Walker 2008). Wherever land has been valued for its productive
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potential, powerful elites have grabbed it from the less powerful via techniques such as
money lending, intimidation, chicanery and explicit violence.3 State involvement is also
nothing new. In post-colonial India the Raj appropriated large tracts of land for industry
and  infrastructure  in  the  name  of  national  projects  of  modernity  and  development
(Levien 2013). Similarly in Bangladesh the government, often with the financial backing
of international  donors,  has expropriated land for the building of  bridges,  roads and
factories since its  birth in 1971.  Meanwhile,  foreign companies have long taken over
forest lands for plantations: witness the tea gardens of Northeast Bangladesh, some of
which were owned by the British company Finlays and supported by British aid into the
1990s (Gardner 1997). Yet whilst the history is deep rooted, recent decades have involved
a shift in the scale and nature of dispossession (Feldman and Geisler 2012; Adnan 2015:
28). In this context Levien’s concept of ‘regimes of dispossession’ is useful. He defines this
as:
..socially and historically specific constellations of state structures, economic logics
tied  to  particular  class  interests  and  ideological  justifications  that  generate  a
consistent pattern of dispossession’ (2013: 383).
7 Levien’s  stress  on  ideological  justification  and  its  link  to  the  extent  and  success  of
resistance is of particular relevance to us. In the post-Independence Nehruvian era of
state owned industry the loss  of  land to steel  plants  and townships  was justified by
nationalist projects of modernity and development; steel plants were to be ‘temples’ to
India’s industrial, secular future, making ‘backward’ areas of forestry or ‘tribals’ a thing
of the past (Levien 2013: 385). Levien suggests that the persuasive power of this vision,
plus the large scale employment offered by the new industries, meant that resistance to
land loss was muted and failed to gain widespread support. In contrast, in the current
neoliberal regime of dispossession, which involves acquiring land for SEZs that fail to
provide meaningful employment for the rural population and a state that has become a
‘gate-keeper’  for  foreign investors,  land grabs  can only  be  justified  by  references  to
‘economic growth’; resistance is thus protracted and more often successful than in the
past (Levien 2013).
8 The historical  specificity of  Levien’s  ‘regimes of  dispossession’  builds in helpful ways
upon David Harvey’s notion of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (or ABD) which has been
used by many scholars  seeking to  analyse  contemporary processes  of  land grab and
dispossession.4 Arguing that capitalism’s chronic problem of over-accumulation is solved
by ‘spatio-temporal fixes’ in which new markets are opened up or resources exploited,
the  concept  helps  us  understand  new  forms  of  capitalism  in  terms  of  space  and
territorialisation (Harvey 2003, 2004). Explored in detail in Adnan’s paper in this volume,
‘ABD’ is a useful starting point in understanding the processes by which dispossession
takes place in South Asia. Empirically the concept raises more questions than it answers
and besides alerting us to the involvement of the state tells us very little about the actual
techniques,  alliances  and  ideological  apparatus  involved.  Indeed,  as  Levien  argues,
Harvey fails to clearly distinguish ADB from primitive accumulation and is vague about
the degree to which it is an economic or extra economic process, involving coercion other
than market forces alone (Levien 2011a: 457). Combined with this, as Hall has pointed out,
the term blunts our attention to specific histories and socio-political relationships (Hall
2011, 2012, 2013). For example, little attention is paid in Harvey’s work to the relations of
property and land use that existed before ABD. It is also assumed that people wish to
continue to work the land when the reality in South / South-East Asia is often to the
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contrary (Hall 2011, 2012, 2013, Li 2014). In a similar vein is the tendency to assume that
locals / peasants / indigenous people / farmers, etc., are united in resistance when the
truth is more messy: local elites who stand to profit may comply with corporations, even
carrying out violence against those who resist, and forming a new rentier class (Welker
2009,  Levien 2011a,  Gardner  2012).  Quite  often,  poor  people  act  out  violence against
others on behalf of their patrons. Such loyalty can derive from affiliation to a political
party but also from ethnic belonging.
9 What  then,  are  we  describing  and  how  are  we  to  capture  the  local  and  historical
specificities? Before we proceed it might help to distinguish conceptually between four
terms  that  are  often  used  interchangeably:  land  grab;  enclosures;  dispossession  and
displacement. The first, land grab is defined by Zoomers as ‘large scale, cross border land
deals or transactions that are carried out by transnational corporations or initiated by
foreign governments’ (Zoomers 2010: 249). Most commentators describe these ‘grabs’5 as
involving agribusiness, responding to the needs of urban populations in wealthy nations
for food and bio-fuels. As Borras et al. put it: ‘The phrase ‘global land grab’ has become a
catch-all  to  describe  and  analyse  the  global  explosion  of  large  scale  (trans)national
commercial  land  transactions’  (2011:  210;  also  Borras  and  Franco  2012).  Though not
confined solely to food and bio-fuel, for conservation, tourism and ‘hideaways’ may also
feature  (Zoomers  2010),6 these  transactions  are  a  response  to  global  food insecurity,
leading to corporations and in some instances states, taking over large tracts of land in
distant  ‘empty’  places  to provide food for  export,  sometimes even importing foreign
labour to do the agricultural work (Borras et al. 2011,  Zoomers 2010,  Makki & Geisler
2011). Overall, the global loss of land from small holders to large scale business concerns
is proceeding at an alarming rate, a ‘frenzy’ of large scale land acquisitions on a ‘colossal’
scale (Makki 2014).
10 Whilst  Zoomers  (2010)  stresses  the  ‘foreignisation  of  space’  as  a  key  component  of
contemporary land grabs, the commericalisation of agriculture can also take place within
national borders (Hall 2013). The large scale privatisation of land and / or common water
resources  for  prawn  and  shrimp  farming  destined  for  export  to  far-flung  markets
including the US and China by private Bangladeshi companies is just one case (see, for
example, Ito 2002, Guhathakurta 2008). Meanwhile, others have suggested that current
land grabs of ‘undeveloped’ territory can be thought of as the globalisation of enclosures 
(Makki 2014). It is worth noting that this term is usually used in the context of land that
was originally held commonly, and as such cannot be accurately used to describe all the
processes described in this volume. Historically the term refers to the process whereby
common land in England was enclosed under acts of parliament, particularly from the
18th to the mid-19th century. This resulted in approximately 6.8 million acres of land
being enclosed, with fences and hedges, from 1604–1914, forcing large numbers of small
holders and peasant farmers off  the land.  The Enclosures were a major cause of  the
demise of peasant farming and the creation of an urban proletariat supplying labour for
the Industrial  Revolution.  Crucially,  the transformation of  common land into private
property involved its commoditisation and integration into market relations. Though this
history might be understood in terms of the incursion of capitalism into the English
countryside, it should not be ‘naturalised’ as solely economic. Rather, the process was
primarily political, involving acts of parliament, peasant resistance and violent coercion,
or as E. P. Thompson classically put it, ‘a plain enough case of class robbery’ (Thompson
1963). Meanwhile, colonialism involved the forced enclosure of land abroad. Historians
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have argued that, like slavery, the enclosures of colonised common lands, either directly
into plantations or indirectly via colonial taxes, augmented and funded enclosures and
industrialisation at home (Makki 2014).
11 Perhaps it is already clear that any attempt to narrow the definition of either ‘land grab’
or  ‘enclosures’  is  doomed to  failure.  Examples  from South Asia  show that  land grab
cannot be described as the ‘foreignisation of land’, since national companies and states
are often involved, whilst confining ‘land grab’ to expropriations made for the purposes
of agribusiness and bio fuel excludes the vast tracts of land lost to industry, housing and
property  speculation.  And  whilst  the  term  ‘enclosures’  reminds  us  of  the  historical
antecedents of current processes, it occludes transfers in which land is already privatised
and enclosed, as, for example, in the case of Bibiyana in Northest Bangladesh described in
Ahasan and Gardner’s paper, or Singur-Nandigram in West Bengal, described by Das.
12 An important reason why we should be cautious in using the term ‘land grab’  is  its
temporal association. The imagery is explicit: land is suddenly and violently seized. Yet as
several of our papers show, the transfer of land from one group of users to another is
often incremental, shifting over time according to complex political processes literally on
the ground. This is illustrated in this volume by Axelby’s paper on how access to and
rights over grazing land by different ethnic groups in Himachal Pradesh are negotiated
over the years and are affected by national political events.
13 Finally,  we need to distinguish between those who use and those who own resources
(Ribot and Peluso 2003), a distinction that the term ‘land grab’ is in danger of blurring.
For example, changes in land ownership might be agreed upon by owners if not users, as
was the case in Bibiyana, Bangladesh, where UK-based owners of land agreed to sell when
the levels of state compensation were raised (see Ahasan & Gardner in this volume; also
Gardner 2012). As this latter case shows, whilst violence might lurk in the background,
the actual process in which fields are transferred from one group of users (the rural poor)
to another (the multinational Chevron) is legal and orderly; here, the term ‘land grab’
clouds the actual techniques used and the complexities of local responses.
14 Similar problems face the term ‘dispossession’.  Like land grab,  ‘dispossession’ carries an
emotional and political punch, but at times can be analytically fuzzy, obscuring rather
than illuminating.  To be dispossessed implies original possession. Yet as many of the
cases  discussed in this  volume demonstrate,  those who use land may not  have legal
tenure.  Indeed,  as  Shelley  Feldman  shows,  Hindus  in  Bangladesh  have  been
constitutionally  dispossessed  since  Partition.  Again,  we  are  cautioned  to  distinguish
between legal property rights and access to resources, or as Axelby explains in his paper,
‘that which (people) are able to derive benefit from’ (this volume). Thus, as Nuremowla
elaborates  in  his  paper  on  the  Phulbari  case,  even  though  they  have  cleared  khas
(government) land from forest, the farmers of Borogram have no papers and thus face
little chance of gaining compensation if open-cast mining at Phulbari goes ahead. And
whilst in the case of the commons, be this grazing land or wetlands used for fishing or
khas land,  the  expropriation  involves  a  traumatic  and  violently  experienced  loss  of
customary rights of access and can indeed be understood as a form of dispossession, in
other cases the politics and socio-economic relationships are more complex.
15 To illustrate this, let us consider two cases from Bangladesh. In the first, what we might
think of as ‘classic’ displacement and dispossession has taken place over many years in
the Chittagong Hill Tracts, where large parts of the indigenous population have faced
displacement  in  various  phases.  In  the  1960s,  a  huge  area  was  swallowed by  a  dam
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construction project; from the 1970s onwards, the government distributed the land used
by  the  local  population  for  shifting  cultivation—considered  ‘empty  land’,  among  in-
migrating settlers. Although the armed conflict in the area was officially pacified in 1997,
the military continues to expropriate land, allegedly for security reasons and for business
purposes (Adnan & Dastidar 2011, Gerharz 2015). Meanwhile, in other cases the processes
are less straightforward, as for example in the Bibiyana gas field where the rural poor
employed by transnational owners as labourers or sharecroppers on the land that was
forcibly acquired had no say in the process and were not compensated. Whilst the gas
field undoubtedly made their agrarian livelihoods even more precarious, to label them
‘dispossessed’ by the gas field is incorrect since they were never the owners of the land.
Rather, they had been forced out of agriculture by wider processes which were taking
place  long  before  the  gas  field  was  constructed,  in  which  agriculture  was  becoming
increasingly  commoditised  and  precarious  (Gardner  2012).  In  this  context,  Misra’s
distinction between large-scale involuntary and sudden dispossession,  caused by land
grab for industry or mining and ‘dispossession in slow motion,’ is helpful (Mishra 2011: 3).
Citing the case of Orissa, Misra argues that both forms work in tandem to create capitalist
accumulation at the expense of the rural poor. Whilst the state’s policy of encouraging
large scale foreign investment for mining has led to substantial resistance, dispossession
in slow motion, a quieter and often hidden process, has involved ‘voluntary’ transfers of
land over longer time periods in which the pincer movements of rising production costs,
indebtedness,  and  neoliberal  policy  have  led  to  agrarian  crisis  and  the  longer term
movement of the rural poor from their land.
16 Here it is useful to consider our final term ‘displacement’. Arising largely from a literature
that focusses upon the large scale movements and resettlement of communities to make
way for development infrastructure, mining or conservation projects (cf.  Parasuraman
1999, Cernea 2006, Agrawal & Redford 2009, Mathur 2008), the term turns our attention
from questions of property and possession to emplacement: the social as well as economic
forces that structure relationships to localities and livelihoods, and indeed the costs of
forced movement. This is illustrated in Nuremowla’s paper. Threatened by Asia Energy’s
proposed mine in Phulbari, people in the village of Borogram are faced not only with the
loss of land but also in hard won social capital, established over the years they have spent
forming relationships within their village. For them, ‘displacement’ means not only the
loss of land but vitally important social protection. Again, however, the term is in danger
of being used too generally, and thus of concealing important differences in the processes
involved.  Feldman and Geisler  make a  useful  distinction between in-situ and ex-situ
displacement  (Feldman  &  Geisler  2012).  Defining  in-situ  displacement  as  ‘the  critical
impairment  of  the  means  of  social  reproduction,’  the  authors  argue  that  in-situ
displacements, which are often invisible because they don’t involve people leaving their
homes, are no less catastrophic than ex-situ displacements, yet are also caused by the
processes of capital accumulation. In the hinterlands of Dhaka, for example, pollution and
illegal building, the filling up of wetlands and threatened as well as actual violence all
contribute to people losing access to land and livelihoods, even if they don’t actually lose
their  homes.  Here  too  we  should  distinguish  between  forced  displacements,  caused
directly by the state (for example, to make way for a mine, as threatened in Phulbari) or
other agencies (for example, local mafia or mustaan who attack Hindu homes, causing
them to flee in Bangladesh) and displacements which take place as a corollary of wider
processes, such as the urbanisation and commodification of land described by Feldman
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and Geisler (2012), or the long-term market processes that have led to a gradual erosion
of agrarian livelihoods over much of South Asia.
17 By scoping out the different meanings of land grab, enclosures, dispossession and displacement
,  our purpose is to strike a note of caution about the interchangeable or fuzzy use of
terms, whilst at the same time revealing their analytic and political potential.  Whilst
some of the papers that follow describe land grab and violent dispossession and others
show  more  subtle,  or  hidden  processes,  all  indicate  the  complex  local  politics  and
meanings that surround the use of and access to land. As other work implies, people are
also not always opposed to the loss of farm land, the privatisation of the commons or the
incursion of the market into the rural economy.7 We therefore cannot make assumptions
about  the nature of  resistance to  land loss.  In  Das’  paper,  for  example,  we see  how
opposition against the proposed TATA car plant in West Bengal arose partly from the
manipulation of grass roots political cadres and party politics and not simply from a
blanket opposition to the proposed development. Had levels of compensation been higher
and the negotiations carried out in a more inclusive style, many farmers would have sold
their  land.  Clearly,  the  potential  gains  of  industrial  development  can  be  highly
persuasive. In the development of the Mahindra World City in Jaipur, Levien shows how
by allowing local farmers to retain 25 per cent of their expropriated land as developed
plots,  with the potential for substantial profit,  the state was able to divide and mute
resistance to the forced acquisition (Levien 2011a). Whilst tempting farmers with ‘get rich
quick’ sweeteners is one way to hedge off potential resistance, in other cases persuasion
is as much discursive as material, for as Jamie Cross has astutely pointed out, hopes and
aspirations for development and modernity are often evoked at the sites of would be SEZs
or other forms of industrialisation in India (Cross 2014). Let us turn to the discursive
formations used in the appropriation of land.
 
Discursive formations
18 What is  the role of  discourse and ideology in justifying and enabling land grabs and
dispossession? As Foucault has shown us, power emerges in discourses that arise from
particular historically-constituted political economies. These ‘architectures of knowledge’
frame the world in taken-for-granted ways,  leading to ‘regimes of  truth’  that appear
unquestionable. Power is dispersed and flowing, rather than being merely repressive: ‘In
fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of
truth’ (Foucault 1991: 194). ‘Development’ is a prime example of a ‘regime of truth’ which
frames the world in particular ways, working to uphold the power of the North over the
South.  As  Makki  shows in  his  discussion of  enclosures  in  Ethiopia,  for  example,  the
predatory land grabs  of  colonialism were historically  justified by the notion of  terra
nullius, in  which  distant  places  were  presented  in  terms  of  empty  wilderness,  their
primitive nature in need of  ‘capitalist  redemption and valorisation’  (Makki  2014:  82).
Indeed, in the post-colonial era, deconstructionist scholars such as Escobar have argued
that the notion of development arose from the need for the North to continue to control
the Global South via a discourse which constructed the ex-colonies in terms of technical
problems and need (Escobar 1995; see also Ferguson 1990).8 More recently, work such as
Emily Yeh’s ethnography of Chinese development projects in Tibet have shown how ‘gifts
of  development’  allow  for  state  territorialisation,  evoking  ambiguity  amongst  the
supposed beneficiaries (Yeh 2013).
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19 The  Tibetan  case  hints  at  a  second  discursive  strand  used  by  states  to  justify  their
incursions  into  new  territories:  ‘security’.  Here  we  come  to  a  paradox  within  the
neoliberal era: the retreat of the welfare state and the deterioration of borders that hold
people, ideas, finance and weapons at bay contribute to the production of (imagined)
insecurity.  Neoliberalism thus  leads  to  a  greater  need for  security,  which in  turn is
masked as ‘development’ or programmes to win ‘hearts and minds.’  This tendency to
disguise security concerns as development has become a dominant tool for controlling
unstable  regions  in  contemporary  India.  Duncan  McDuie-Ra’s  analysis  of  the  North
Eastern Region Vision 2020 released by the Government in 2008 shows that although the
official aim of this policy agenda is to achieve peace and prosperity in India’s North East,
it primarily aims at consolidating India’s hegemonic position in the region (McDuie-Ra
2009).  Similar  developments  can  be  observed  in  post-conflict  Sri  Lanka,  where
reconstruction measures in the war-torn region have been explicitly related to counter-
insurgency  and  enduring  militarisation  (Goodhand  2010,  Höglund  &  Orjuela  2011).
Meanwhile, in the case of Jharkand discussed by Sareen in this volume, ‘development for
security’  is  used  by  the  state  to  justify  large-scale  road-building  projects  that  seem
destined for  mining operations  rather  than the anti-poverty  projects  of  the  Sarenda
Action plan. Whether we interpret the Sarenda Action Plan as a deliberate and explicit
element of the ‘Ideological State Apparatus,’ or as a less-conscious discourse which brings
the unintended (though for the state and corporate interests desirable) consequences of
infrastructure and accountable local populations, is a matter of theoretical orientation.
20 Whilst development may be understood as a crucial component of the ‘regime of truth’
that justified colonisation, what distinguishes the current era is its use by corporations. A
growing  body  of  ethnographic  work  focusses  upon  the  so-called  ‘corporate  social
responsibility’  (CSR)  of  extractive  industries,  often  offered  as  an  appeasing  gift  to
populations  in  the  areas  where  the  extraction  of  resources  takes  place  (Rajak  2011,
Welker 2012, 2014, Frynas 2005, Kapelus 2002). As this demonstrates, extractive industries
are keen to show a ‘smiling face’ (Shever 2010) by offering a range of development gifts
which attempt to rebrand the corporation as compassionate, caring, in partnership with
‘local  communities’  (Zilak  2004,  Rajak,  2009,  2011)  or  manipulating the discourses  of
environmentalism with which they are critiqued to suggest that their work is sustainable
and that they are protecting the environment and contributing to local culture (Welker
2009, Kirsch 2014, Rogers 2012).
21 A striking aspect of many of the CSR programmes of extractive industries is the use of
NGOs to carry out their programmes, often in alliance with the local elite, who may also
be acting as contractors or brokers for the company.9 In other cases, mining companies
use NGO programmes to keep elites ‘on side’ by offering them leadership roles in the
dispensation  of  development  goods,  whilst  attempting  to  procure  the  NGO’s  good
reputation. In Ahasan and Gardner’s paper in this volume, two examples from Bangladesh
are  discussed  which  show  how  in  order  to  gain  the  ‘social  license  to  operate,’
corporations  plug  into  discourses  of  development  which  present  land  loss  and  the
extraction  of  resources  as  necessary  for  national  growth  and  development,  whilst
offering development gifts that will supposedly benefit the community. In an interesting
echo of terra nullis, in Bibiyana, Chevron’s CSR executives were keen to stress that before
their arrival ‘there was nothing there’ in the way of NGO projects (Gardner 2012), whilst
in Dumki, Sylhet, the JT Corporation set out an ‘uplifting project’ which would remedy
the ‘problem’ of low productivity in the area.
Land, ‘Development’ and ‘Security’ in Bangladesh and India: An Introduction
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 13 | 2016
9
22 Despite  these  efforts,  the  justifications  used  by  corporations  and  states  in  the
expropriations of land are not always accepted by local populations. Instead they are
either vociferously contested (as in Phulbari, described in this volume by Nuremowla),
ignored (as in the Dumki case, in which the corporation’s plans were rejected by the NGO,
described in this volume by Ahasan and Gardner) or they find partial acceptance, with
some groups taking up the plans and their ideological justifications whilst others remain
unconvinced (as in Bibiyana). In these cases, discourses of development fail to convince,
or clash with alternative understandings of what development should be (Gardner 2012).
Issues  of  scale  are  important  too:  for  whom  is  the  justification  made?  For  local
populations  in  order  to  gain  compliance,  or  for  national  and  global  audiences  and
shareholders, in which case reputation is all?
23 If the discourses of development—and agents in the guise of NGOs—are increasingly being
used by corporations rather than states to justify land appropriation, questions are raised
concerning the relationship between states and corporations. Is it the case, for example,
that in the neoliberal era states have become ‘shadow states’ (Harriss-White 2003), mere
land brokers for private interests? Let us turn to the varied forms of state-corporate
coalitions in Bangladesh and India.
 
The ‘neoliberal’ state and its corporate coalitions
24 As our discussion so far implies, neoliberalism does not simply lead to the retreat of the
state.  Instead,  recent  tendencies  towards  trans-nationalisation  and  privatisation
transform the state and the particular ways in which governance is performed (Randeria
2003, Ferguson 2004, Gupta & Sharma 2006, Sharma & Gupta 2006). In this context we can
understand  the  institutions  of  states  as  part  of  an  intricate  constellation  of  actors,
including  NGOs,  schools,  communities  and  companies  located  at  and  acting  across
different spatial scales. In some cases, states may strategise in particular ways in their
responses to global forces for justice or development. Based on her empirical inquiry into
environmental justice in India, for example, Shalini Randeria has pointed out that states
may become ‘cunning states, which capitalise on their perceived weaknesses in order to
render themselves unaccountable’  (Randeria 2003:  306).  But  the contributions to this
volume  also  reveal  how  we  need  to  conceptualise  the  state  as  ‘a  multi-layered,
contradictory, translocal ensemble of institutions, practices and people’ (Sharma & Gupta
2006: 6) in order to understand the ways in which it regulates the access to and loss of
land.  In Sareen’s contribution,  for example,  the military renders ‘stateness’  visible in
people’s everyday lives, while in Das’ paper, the political party takes over the functions of
the local state.
25 Acknowledging that neoliberal  reforms in India in the early 1990s mark a significant
turning  point,  scholars  have  embarked  on  the  use  of  concepts  inspired  by
governmentality  studies  to  figure  out  the  ways  in  which  neoliberalism leads  to  the
carving out of  exceptional  spaces (Ong 2006)  and the role of  states in this  (Le Mons
Walker 2009, Baka 2013, Münster & Strümpell 2014, Adnan 2015). As we have implied,
whereas  earlier  initiatives  were  regarded  as  initiated  by  the  state  and  for  the
development of the entire nation, legitimised with the notion of ‘public purpose’ (Mehta
2009: xxxii),  the involvement of,  if  not exclusive role played by, corporate actors has
provoked a shift in perspective. In considering these processes let us briefly outline some
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differences between Bangladesh and India, a task taken further in Adnan’s article in this
volume.
26 In  India,  neoliberal  reforms were unleashed in 1991,  when the government  abruptly
dismantled the so-called ‘License Raj system’, e.g. tight regulations for the establishment
of businesses. The measure was a clear break with previous policies based on the ideals of
a  planned  economy.  Massive  programmes  of  privatisation  and  structural  adjustment
followed (Le Mons Walker 2009: 559, Adnan 2015: 27). Whereas the drastic deregulation
fostered rapid economic growth at the macro-level, the measures also went along with
land grab at a large scale.
27 Meanwhile,  in  Bangladesh,  the  development  of  an  export-oriented  economy
concentrating on the textile industry has led to a major source of income (Kabeer 2002,
Dannecker 2002). It has been widely agreed that the garment boom in the 1980s ushered
in the era of neoliberalism in Bangladesh, with comprehensive economic restructuration
and transformations of urban spaces, as well as the agrarian sector: Feldman and Geisler
argue  that  the  transition  in  export  production  from  agricultural  commodities  to
manufacturing goods displaced agriculture as a central focus of investment (Feldman &
Geisler  2012:  982). Similarly  in  India,  financial  liberalisation  led  to  a  decline  in
institutional credit for agriculture and provoked an agrarian crisis, which led not only to
growing incidences of starvation and farmer suicides, but also the loss of land due to
growing rural indebtedness after state subsidies were removed (Le Mons Walker 2008:
572). In both Bangladesh and India, the state and also the state governments promulgated
laws and policies that facilitated corporate access to land and natural resources (Adnan
2015:  29).  Meanwhile,  rights  and entitlements  of  vulnerable  groups  were  denied,  for
example  by  dismantling  constitutional  provisions  and  laws  protecting  the  rights  of
indigenous populations (Baviskar 1995, Khagram 2004, Ghosh 2006). In both countries, the
displacement of indigenous populations has led to the formation of social movements
which  capitalise  on  the  recent  institutionalisation  of  indigenous  people’s  rights  and
discourses at international levels, but which the state has been remarkably resilient to. In
Bangladesh for example, the state resisted the activists’ demands to implement the Peace
Accord  in  the  Chittagong  Hill  Tracts  and  despite  massive  international  pressure
continued to transfer power to the military (Gerharz 2014).
28 In India,  the formation of  SEZs has been a major aspect  of  state attempts to attract
foreign investors since 2000. SEZs have been considered as a ‘systematic framework for
land grabs’ (Adnan 2015: 28), and not surprisingly have involved substantial resistance,
often over inappropriate levels of compensation (Costa 2007). In Bangladesh, SEZs have
been  established  since  the  1980s,  when  Ershad  implemented  structural  adjustments
programmes to counter the negative effects of nationalising all major industries after
independence. In contrast to India, however, the establishments of SEZ’s and the textile
sector in Bangladesh have met with little resistance, partly because of the generation of
employment opportunities, especially in the textile industry which grew rapidly in the
early 1980s and has not only turned into a major national source of income but has also
generated a large number of jobs, primarily for women (Dannecker 2002). This garment
boom took place  in  a  period of  intensive  nation-building and served as  the  ‘natural
reward for successful national integration’ (Ferguson 2004: 387).
29 Ironically,  the  Bangladeshi  experience  shows that  whilst  nation-building  may be  the
characteristic rhetoric of the state, it does not necessarily lead to a strong state. In her
work on micro-finance  schemes  of  NGOs,  Lamia  Karim observes  that  in  postcolonial
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countries where ‘the notion of citizenship as a set of entitlements that are bound up with
a nation-state that guarantees those rights, is lacking’ (Karim 2008: 6), populations are
served by non-state actors instead. Thus the country is characterised by an extremely
high number of NGOs who govern the poor population in rural areas. This has led to the
accusations that NGOs operate as a ‘shadow state’ (Karim 2011). It is in this context that
corporations seeking a ‘social license to operate’ attempt to forge relationships with NGOs
as well as states, as shown by Ahasan and Gardner’s paper in this volume.
30 Both the Bangladeshi and Indian examples show that neoliberalism does not lead to the
replacement of the state by market forces or corporations, but ‘works by multiplying sites
for  regulation  and  domination  through  the  creation  of  autonomous  entities  of
government  that  are  not  [necessarily]  part  of  the  formal  state  apparatus’  (Gupta  &
Sharma 2006:  277).  From this  it  is  important  to  investigate  the particular  ways  that
governments and other actors govern access to land. Here again, the relationships and
outcomes involved are complex. In this volume, Das’ paper shows how the Government of
West Bengal, dominated by the Communist Party of India, Marxist (CPIM), turned into the
land broker for Tata Motors Ltd in Singur in 2006. Das elucidates how the ‘alternative
bureaucracy’  owned  and  controlled  by  the  CPIM  took  over  the  tasks  of  the  state
institutions  and  how  local  responses  were  mediated  and  intricately  linked  to  party
politics at the grassroots level.
31 Whilst in Singur farmers resisting TATA’s development were ultimately successful, the
process involved significant violence. As this implies, whilst discourses of development
and security may be central  to contemporary land appropriations in South Asia,  and
justifications of ‘uplift’ and ‘empowerment’, plus alliances with reputable NGOs, used to
present a ‘smiling face’ by corporations, this is shadowed by a more traditional method:
violence. Let us turn to the ways this is used by states and private interests to appropriate
land in the neoliberal era. This introduces another crucial player: the military.
 
Security, violence, and the military
32 Clearly, the relationships between state, society and the market are complex. One thing
which all the papers in the volume have in common, however, is the way in which land
appropriations take recourse in either ‘legality’ or violence (or, in many cases, both). In
this section we see how whilst  discursive formations of  development,  modernity and
security  are  habitually  used  in  the  appropriation  of  land,  legal  measures,  often
underpinned by the threat of violence, are a tried and tested back up. In this context, the
role of the military is of great importance.
33 Feldman’s account in this volume of the Vested Property Act as a means to expropriate
members of the Hindu minority in Bangladesh shows how the state is directly responsible
for  the  loss  of  land  amongst  Hindus.  The  effect  has  been  the  ongoing  migration  of
Bangladeshi  Hindus in response to everyday insecurity and,  more than often,  violent
expulsion. As Feldman’s papers shows, the state justifies land appropriation in the name
of national security against ‘enemy’ Hindus.
34 While ethnic belonging and nationalist exclusion are justifications for land grab by the
state,  neoliberal  reforms  have  resulted  in  the  restructuration  of  state  institutions.
Feldman and Geisler (2012: 982) argue that civilian and military elites were given greater
voice in decision making to secure Ershad’s security in Bangladesh during the 1980s, a
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strategy which has proved to have remarkable continuity. As a consequence, elites have
been  successful  in  gaining  control  over  government  properties,  with  devastating
consequences for water quality and the livelihoods of small farmers.
35 Whilst  Feldman  and  Geisler  (2012:  982)  refer  to  a  well-known  phenomenon  in
contemporary  Bangladesh—gangs  hired  by  elite  encroachers  who  use  violence  to
appropriate  land  illegally—fear  is  not  only  produced  by  extra-legal  actors;  the
involvement of the military also gives good reason for anticipating violence. Ahasan and
Gardner’s paper makes similar observations: whilst corporations stand back to allow land
to be taken,  in Bangladesh the state is  likely to turn to violence,  via the police and
military.  Meanwhile,  in Phulbari  and Singur,  as  documented by Nuremowla and Das,
police violence at demonstrations led to deaths.
36 The actuality of  potential  violence resembles recent trends in other countries in the
South Asian region and beyond.  In  Sri  Lanka,  for  example,  the  militarisation of  the
territories  ‘liberated’  from the  Liberation  Tigers  of  Tamil  Eelam (LTTE)  in  2009  has
become a salient feature. In India,  the dangers of ‘Islamic terrorism’ plus Maoist and
Naxalite movements are regarded as a major security threat, serving as a justification to
increase the budget for the securitisation of  borders and counter terrorist  measures.
Within this context, Sareen’s paper addresses the security-development-nexus, a strategy
employed  by  the  Indian  government  to  pacify  unruly  territories  in  Jharkand’s  West
Singhbhum district.
37 How do those at the receiving end of this violence make sense of it, whether in the form
of its potential or its actuality? In Nuremowla’s paper we see how the anxieties produced
by stories  of  the devastation caused by land appropriation can be read as  a  kind of
violence in Phulbari. Faced with the loss not only of land but also community and the
social protection it brings, people face an uncertain future. Many are prepared to use
force to protect their interests, knowing that the state will respond with violence, for in
previous years people have been killed by the police during protests.  The ability and
willingness to engage in protest varies. This raises important questions which remain
beyond the scope of  this  volume but  require  further research:  how is  land loss  and
displacement experienced by different people? What are the prerequisites for engaging in
resistance against the loss of land? Here, questions of gender, generation and ethnicity,
but also education, cultural and social capital, are likely to be central.
38 To conclude, in the seven papers that follow we offer new empirical material and insights
into the processes surrounding land loss and change of use in Bangladesh and India.
Shapan  Adnan’s  theoretical  review  develops  a  typology  of  the  mechanisms  of  land
alienation  and  identifies  the  diverse  range  of  land  appropriating  mechanisms  in
Bangladesh and India. The complex ways in which different groups get access to land and
how this shifts over time are analysed in Richard Axelby’s article on grazing rights in
Himachal  Pradesh.  Sadid  Nuremowla’s  contribution  shows  that  dispossession  is  not
limited to the mere loss of farming land, but extends to existing social ties of the people
living in the locality of a proposed open-cast mine at Phulbari, Bangladesh. Taking the
case of Bangladesh’s nationalist project as an example, Shelley Feldman’s paper shows
how the exclusion of Hindus has been enshrined by law. In Siddarth Sareen’s paper, the
actual practices by which governmental development interventions produce inequitable
access to resources are analysed via empirical material on the Saranda Action Plan in
Jharkhand,  India.  The  last  two  papers  deal  with  the  involvement  of  multinational
corporations and its consequences: Ritanjan Das shows the complexities emerging from
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resistance to land dispossession by TATA at Singur, West Bengal, and the ways in which
resistance and acquiescence coalesce  with state  politics,  while  Abu Ahasan and Katy
Gardner  reveal  the  steps  taken  by  corporations  in  gaining  access  to  resources,  in
particular their attempt to build alliances with NGOs as well as states and local elites in
Bangladesh. Whilst being aware of the geographical limitations of the work, we hope that
the questions raised will lead to further research in South Asia.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adduci, Matilde (2009) ‘Neoliberal Wave Rocks Chilika Lake, India: Conflict over Intensive
Aquaculture from a Class Perspective’, Journal Of Agrarian Change, 9(4), pp. 484–511.
Adnan, Shapan (2015) ‘Primitive Accumulation and the “Transition to Capitalism” in Neoliberal
India: Mechanisms, Resistance and the Persistance of Self-employed Labour’, in Barbara Harriss-
White & Judith Heyer (eds.), Indian Captialism in Development, London & New York: Routledge,
pp. 23–54.
Adnan, Shapan (2013) ‘Land Grabs and Primitive Accumulation in Deltaic Bangladesh:
Interactions between Neoliberal Globalization, State Interventions, Power Relations and Peasant
Resistance’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(1), pp. 87–128.
Adnan, Shapan; Dastidar, Ritanjan (2005) Alienation of the Lands of Indigenous Peoples in the
Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh, Dhaka, Copenhagen: Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission;
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs.
Agrawal, Arjun; Redford, Kent (2009) ‘Conservation and Displacement: An Overview’, Conservation
and Society, 7(1), pp. 1–10.
Akram-Lodhi, A. Haroon (2009) ‘Modernising Subordination? A South Asian Perspective on the
World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 36(3),
pp. 611–19.
Akram-Lodhi, A. Haroon (2007) ‘Land, Markets and Neoliberal Enclosure: An Agrarian Political
Economy Perspective’, Third World Quarterly, 28(8), pp. 1437–56.
Baka, Jennifer (2013) ‘The Political Construction of ‘Wasteland’: Governmentality, Land
Acquisition and Social Inequality in South India’, Development and Change, 44(2), pp. 409–28.
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (1986 [1983]) The Net: Power Structure in Ten Villages (2
nd ed.), Dhaka: BRAC Prokashana.
Baviskar, Amita (1995) In the Belly of the River: Tribal Conflicts over Development in the Narmada Valley,
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Borras Jr., Saturnino M.; Hall, Ruth; Scoones, Ian; White, Ben; Wolford, Wendy (2011) ‘Towards a
Better Understanding of Global Land Grabbing: An Editorial Introduction’, Journal of Peasant
Studies, 38(2), pp. 209–16.
Borras Jr., Saturnino M.; Franco, Jennifer C. (2012) ‘Global Land Grabbing and Trajectories of
Agrarian Change: A Preliminary Analysis’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 12(1), pp. 34–59.
Land, ‘Development’ and ‘Security’ in Bangladesh and India: An Introduction
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 13 | 2016
14
Breman, Jan (2010) Outcast Labour in Asia: Circulation and Informalization of the Workforce at the
Bottom of the Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Breman, Jan (2007) The Poverty Regime in Village India: Half a Century of Work and Life at the Bottom of
the Rural Economy in South Gujarat, New Delhi & New York: Oxford University Press.
Breman, Jan (1993) Beyond Patronage and Exploitation: Changing Agrarian Relations in South Gujarat,
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Cernea, Michael M., 2006 ‘Re-examining “Displacement”: A Redefinition of Concepts in
Development and Conservation Policies’, Social Change, 36(1), pp. 8–35.
Corbridge, Stuart; Shah, Alpa (2013) ‘Introduction: The Underbelly of the Indian Boom’, Economy
and Society, 42(3), pp. 335–47.
Costa, Dia Da (2007) ‘Tensions of Neo-liberal Development: State Discourse and Dramatic
Opposition in West Bengal’, Contributions to Indian Sociology, 41(3), pp. 287–320.
Cross, Jamie (2014) Dream Zones: Anticipating Capitalism and Development in India, London: Pluto
Press.
Dannecker, Petra (2002) Between Conformity and Resistance: Women Garment Workers in Bangladesh,
Dhaka: University Press Ltd.
Drèze, Jean; Sen, Amartya (2013) An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions, London: Penguin
Books.
Escobar, Arturo (1995) Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fairhead, James; Leach, Melissa; Scoones, Ian (2012) ‘Green Grabbing: A New Appropriation of
Nature?’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(2), pp. 237–61.
Feldman, Shelley; Geisler, Charles (2012) ‘Land Expropriation and Displacement in Bangladesh’, 
Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(3–4), pp. 971–93.
Ferguson, James (2004) ‘Power Topographies’, in David Nugent & Joan Vincent (eds.), A Companion
to the Anthropology of Politics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 383–99.
Ferguson, James (1990) The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development’, Depoliticization and Bureaucratic
Power in Lesotho, Cambridge, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
Foucault, Michel (1979 [1975]) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of a Prison, London: Penguin Books.
Frynas, Jedrzej G. (2005) ‘The False Developmental Promise of Corporate Social Responsibility:
Evidence from Multinational Oil Companies’, International Affairs, 81(3), pp. 581–98.
Gardner, Katy (2012) Discordant Developments: Global Capital and the Struggle for Connection in
Bangladesh, London: Pluto Press.
Gardner, Katy (1997) ‘Mixed Messages: Contested “Development” and the Plantation
Rehabilitation Project’, in Ralph D. Grillo & Roderick L. Stirrat (eds.), Discourses of Development:
Anthropological Perspectives, Oxford & New York: Berg Publishers, pp. 133–57.
Gardner, Katy; Ahmed, Zahir; Bashir, Fatema; Rana, Masud (2012) ‘Elusive Partnerships: Gas
Extraction and CSR in Bangladesh’, Resources Policy, 37(2), pp. 168–74.
Gerharz, Eva (2015) ‘What Is in a Name? Indigenous Identity and the Politics of Denial in
Bangladesh’, South Asia Chronicle, 4, URL: http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/suedasien/band-4/115/
PDF/115.pdf.
Land, ‘Development’ and ‘Security’ in Bangladesh and India: An Introduction
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 13 | 2016
15
Gerharz, Eva (2014) ‘Recognising Indigenous People, the Bangladeshi Way: The United Nations
Declaration, Transnational Activism and the Constitutional Amendment Affair of 2011’, 
Indigenous Policy Journal, 24(4), pp. 64–79.
Ghosh, Kaushik (2006) ‘Between Global Flows and Local Dams: Indigenousness, Locality, and the
Transnational Sphere in Jharkhand, India’, Cultural Anthropology, 21(4), pp. 501–34.
Goldman, Michael (2011) ‘Speculative Urbanism and the Making of the Next World City’, 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 35(3), pp. 555–81.
Goodhand, Jonathan (2010) ‘Stabilizing a Victor’s Peace? Humanitarian Action and
Reconstruction in Eastern Sri Lanka’, Disasters, 34(3), pp. 342–67.
Guhathakurta, Meghna (2008) ‘Globalization, Class and Gender Relations: The Shrimp Industry in
Southwestern Bangladesh’, Development, 51(2), pp. 212–9.
Gupta, Akhil; Sharma, Aradhana (2006) ‘Globalization and Postcolonial States’, Current
Anthropology, 47(2), pp. 277–307.
Hall, Derek (2013) ‘Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession and the Global Land
Grab’, Third World Quarterly, 34(9), pp. 1582–604.
Hall, Derek (2012) ‘Rethinking Primitive Accumulation: Theoretical Tensions and Rural Southeast
Asian Complexities’, Antipode, 44(4), pp. 1188–208.
Hall, Derek (2011) ‘Land Grabs, Land Control, and Southeast Asian Crop Booms’, Journal of Peasant
Studies, 38(4), pp. 811–31.
Harriss-White, Barbara (2009) ‘Globalization, the Financial Crisis and Petty Production in India’s
Socially Regulated Informal Economy’, Global Labour Journal, 1(1), pp. 152–77.
Harriss-White, Barbara (2005) India’s Market Society, New Delhi: Three Essays Press.
Harriss-White, Barbara (2003) India Working: Essays on Society and Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Harriss-White, Barbara; Mishra, Deepak K.; Upadhyay, Vandana (2009) ‘Institutional Diversity
and Capitalist Transition: The Political Economy of Agrarian Change in Arunachal Pradesh, India’,
Journal of Agrarian Change, 9(4), pp. 512–47.
Hartman, Betsy; Boyce, James K. (1983) A Quiet Violence: View from a Bangladesh Village, London: Zed
Books.
Harvey, David (2004) ‘The “New” Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession’, Socialist Register, 
40, pp. 63–87.
Harvey, David (2003) The New Imperialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Höglund, Kristine; Orjuela, Camilla (2011) ‘Winning the Peace: Conflict Prevention after a Victor’s
Peace in Sri Lanka’, Contemporary Social Science, 6(1), pp. 19–37.
Ito, Sanae (2002) ‘From Rice to Prawns: Economic Transformation and Agrarian Structure in
Rural Bangladesh’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 29(2), pp. 47–70.
Kabeer, Naila (2000) The Power to Choose: Bangladeshi Women and Labour Market Decisions in London
and Dhaka, London & New York: Verso.
Karim, Lamia (2011) Microfinance and its Discontents: Women in Debt in Bangladesh, Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Land, ‘Development’ and ‘Security’ in Bangladesh and India: An Introduction
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 13 | 2016
16
Karim, Lamia (2008) ‘Demystifying Micro-Credit: The Grameen Bank, NGOs, and Neoliberalism in
Bangladesh’, Cultural Dynamics, 20(1), pp. 5–29.
Kapelus, Paul (2002) ‘Mining, Corporate Social Responsibility and the “Community”: The Case of
Rio Tinto, Richards Bay Minerals and the Mbonambi’, Journal of Business Ethics, 39(3), pp. 275–96.
Khagram, Sanjeev (2004) Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water and Power, Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Kirsch, Stuart (2014) Mining Capitalism: The Relationship between Corporations and their Critics,
Oakland: University of California Press.
Le Mons Walker, Kathy (2008) ‘Neoliberalism on the Ground in Rural India: Predatory Growth,
Agrarian Crisis, Internal Colonization, and the Intensification of Class Struggle’, Journal of Peasant
Studies, 35(4), pp. 557–620.
Lerche, Jens (2011) ‘Agrarian Crisis and Agrarian Questions in India’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 11
(1), pp. 104–18.
Levien, Michael (2013) ‘Regimes of Dispossession: From Steel Towns to Special Economic Zones’, 
Development and Change, 44(2), pp. 381–407.
Levien, Michael (2012) ‘The Land Question: Special Economic Zones and the Political Economy of
Dispossession in India’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(3–4), pp. 933–69.
Levien, Michael (2011a) ‘Special Economic Zones and Accumulation by Dispossession in India’, 
Journal of Agrarian Change, 11(4), pp. 454–83.
Levien, Michael (2011b) ‘Rationalising Dispossession: The Land Acquisition and Resettlement
Bills’, Economic and Political Weekly, 46(11), pp. 66–71.
Li, Tania (2014) Land’s End: Capitalist Relations on an Indigenous Frontier, Durham: Duke University
Press.
Makki, Fouad (2014) ‘Development by Dispossession: Terra Nullius and the Social‐Ecology of New
Enclosures in Ethiopia’, Rural Sociology, 79(1), pp. 79–103.
Makki, Fouad; Geisler, Charles (2011) ‘Development by Dispossession: Land Grabbing as New
Enclosures in Contemporary Ethiopia’, paper presented at the international conference on Global
Land Grabbing, University of Sussex, 06–08/04/2011.
Mathur, Hari Mohan (2008) India: Social Development Report 2008: Development and Displacement,
Oxford University Press.
McDuie-Ra, Duncan (2009) ‘Vision 2020 or Re-Vision 1958: The Contradictory Politics of Counter-
Insurgency in India’s Regional Engagement’, Contemporary South Asia, 17(3), pp. 313–30.
Mehta, Lyla (2009) Displaced by Development: Confronting Marginalisation and Gender Injustice, Delhi:
Sage Publications.
Mishra, Deepak K. (2011) ‘Behind Dispossession: State, Land Grabbing and Agrarian Change in
Rural Orissa’, paper presented at the international conference on Global Land Grabbing, University
of Sussex, 06–08/04/2011.
Mohanty, B. B. (2005) ‘“We are Like the Living Dead”: Farmer Suicides in Maharashtra, Western
India’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 32(2), pp. 243–76.
Münster, Daniel; Strümpell, Christian (2014) ‘The Anthropology of Neoliberal India: An
Introduction’, Contributions to Indian Sociology, 48(1), pp. 1–16.
Land, ‘Development’ and ‘Security’ in Bangladesh and India: An Introduction
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 13 | 2016
17
Münster, Daniel; Münster, Ursula (2012) ‘Consuming the Forest in an Environment of Crisis:
Nature Tourism, Forest Conservation and Neoliberal Agriculture in South India’, Development and
Change, 43(1), pp. 205–27.
Ong, Aihwa (2006) Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty, Durham: Duke
University Press.
Padel, Felix; Das, Samarendra (2010) Out of This Earth: East India Adivasis and the Aluminium Cartel,
New Delhi: Orient Blackswan.
Parasuraman, Saroj (1999) The Development Dilemma: Displacement in India, Macmillan Press Ltd.
Rajak, Dinah (2011) In Good Company: An Anatomy of Corporate Social Responsibility, Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Randeria, Shalini (2003) ‘Cunning States and Unaccountable International Institutions: Legal
Plurality, Social Movements and Rights of Local Communities to Common Property Resources’, 
European Journal of Sociology, 44(1), pp. 27–60.
Reddy, D. Narasimha; Mishra, Srijit (2009) Agrarian Crisis in India, New Delhi: Oxford University
Press.
Ribot, Jesse C.; Peluso, Nancy Lee (2003) ‘A Theory of Access’, Rural Sociology, 68(2), pp. 153–81.
Rogers, Douglas (2012) ‘The Materiality of the Corporation: Oil, Gas, and Corporate Social
Technologies in the Remaking of a Russian Region’, American Ethnologist, 39(2), pp. 284–96.
Sharma, Aradhana; Gupta, Akhil (2006) ‘Introduction: Rethinking Theories of the State in an Age
of Globalization’, in Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta (eds.), The Anthropology of the State: A
Reader, Malden & Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1–41.
Shever, Elena (2010) ‘Engendering the Company: Corporate Personhood and the “Face” of an Oil
Company in Metropolitan Buenos Aires’, Political and Legal Anthropology Review, 33(1), pp. 26–45.
Siddiqui, Kalim (2015) ‘Agrarian Crisis and Transformation in India’, Journal of Economics and
Political Economy, 2(1), pp. 3–22.
Thompson, Edward. P. (1963) The Making of the English Working Class, London: Gollancz.
Vijayabaskar, M. (2010) ‘Saving Agricultural Labour from Agriculture: SEZs and Politics of Silence
in Tamil Nadu’, Economic and Political Weekly, 45(6), pp. 36–43.
Welker, Marina (2014) Enacting the Corporation: An American Mining Firm in Post Authoritarian
Indonesia, Berkely, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press.
Welker, Marina (2012) ‘The Green Revolution’s Ghost: Unruly Subjects of Participatory
Development in Rural Indonesia’, American Ethnologist, 39(2): pp. 389–406.
Welker, Marina (2009) ‘Corporate Security Begins in the Community’: Mining, the Corporate
Social Responsibility Industry, and Environmental Advocacy in Indonesia’, Cultural Anthropology,
24(1), pp. 142–79.
Yeh, Emily T. (2013) Taming Tibet: Landscape Transformation and the Gift of Chinese Development,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Ziai, Aram (2004) ‘The Ambivalence of Post‐Development: Between Reactionary Populism and
Radical Democracy’, Third World Quarterly, 25(6), pp. 1045–60.
Zoomers, Annelies (2010) ‘Globalisation and the Foreignisation of Space: Seven Processes Driving
the Current Global Land Grab’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 37(2), pp. 429–47.
Land, ‘Development’ and ‘Security’ in Bangladesh and India: An Introduction
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 13 | 2016
18
NOTES
1. See Ito (2002) for work on prawn cultivation in Bangladesh.
2. Though see older literature on land grab and peasant inequalities / violence in Bangladesh e.g. 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (1986), Hartman & Boyce (1983); more recently, see
Feldman & Geisler (2012) and Adnan (2013).
3. See Hartman & Boyce (1983).
4. For a summary, see Münster & Strümpell (2014).
5. Makki and Geisler point out that in the African context these transactions are often long term
leases rather than sales, making the term a misnomer (2011: 2).
6. See also Fairhead et al. (2012) on ‘Green Grabbing’.
7. See Li (2014) for an Indonesian example.
8. For extended discussion and critique see Gardner & Lewis (2015), Ziai (2004).
9. See Welker (2009) for an Indonesian example.
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